Punishing Costs in Compulsory Public Goods Games
Resumen
In public goods games, the principal obstacle to obtaining cooperation is the temptation to be a free-rider, this is, to benefit from the game without contributing [7]. In order to reduce defection, incentives are applied [1]; however, rewards or punishment are costly, and therefore, difficult to implement [4, 5]. To address this problem, one option is to sanction only a subset d of the defectors in the population; this mechanism, called fractional punishment [3], reduces the cost while improving cooperation.
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