Real Time Manual Control of Fractional Punishment in Optional Public Goods Game
Abstract
Interpreting the results of simulating a non linear system of differential equations requires a great deal of background knowledge about the system that is being analyzed. If a controller is implemented, the dynamics of the system may change completely, creating another barrier in the time that is needed to analyze the system.
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References
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